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METAPHOR AND ANALOGY: THE SUN AND
MOON OF LEGAL PERSUASION
Linda L. Berger
If we insist upon confining ourselves to
scrupulously rational modes of thought and
discussion, . . . this may well have the effect of
granting inappropriate influence to pre-existing
biases . . . . Against this, harnessing the power of
imagination to reconfigure our thoughts by more
intuitive means may enable us to counteract these
biases in a more thoroughgoing way.1
INTRODUCTION
Metaphor and analogy are the sun and moon of legal
persuasion. But which is the sun and which is the moon? Metaphor
is the sun, according to linguist George Lakoff and philosopher
Mark Johnson, because all human thought and expression revolve
around it.2 Analogy researcher Doug Hofstadter would counter that
* Linda L. Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Kathy Stanchi,
Sara Gordon, Terry Pollman, and the organizers of and other participants in the
Brooklyn Symposium on Cognitive Bias and Persuasion.
1
Elisabeth Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor,
Fiction, and Thought Experiments, in 33 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 107,
128 (Peter A. French ed., 2009) [hereinafter Camp, Two Varieties of Literary
Imagination].
2
See, e.g., MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, The
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 202 (Andrew
Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) [hereinafter
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS]; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
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analogy is like the sun because analogy fills the sky of human
cognition.3 And when Romeo proclaims that Juliet is the sun,
Romeo is asking us to view Juliet through a perspective that
reflects light on certain of her features and not others: “her beauty,
her uniqueness, and the warmth with which she fills his heart.”4
For those interested in legal persuasion, metaphor and analogy
constitute both sun and moon. Providing comparison,
categorization, and perspective, they are our primary sources of
generated and reflected light. Put another way, because metaphor
and analogy are the primary ways in which we are able to see one
thing “as” another, they are the primary ways in which we
understand new information (here’s a comparable example);
determine where something new likely fits (that looks like the right
slot); or suggest a different point of view (now I see what you
mean).
According to recent cognitive research into the processing of
analogy and metaphor, the important distinction is not between
metaphor and analogy but rather between novel and conventional
metaphors.5 This research suggests that novel characterizations and
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN
THE FLESH]; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND
MIND (2001).
3
Although he does not actually claim that analogy is like the sun,
Hofstadter uses a related metaphor: “[A]nalogy is anything but a bitty blip [in
the broad blue sky of cognition]—rather, it’s the very blue that fills the whole
sky of cognition—analogy is everything, or very nearly so, in my view.”
Douglas R. Hofstadter, Epilogue: Analogy as the Core of Cognition, in THE
ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 499, 499 (Dedre
Gentner et al. eds., 2001).
4
Elisabeth Camp, Showing, Telling and Seeing: Metaphor and “Poetic”
Language, 3 BALTIC INT’L Y.B. COGNITION, LOGIC & COMM., Aug. 2008, at 1, 2
[hereinafter Camp, Showing, Telling, and Seeing]. The metaphor from WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, has been explained in different
ways. See Dan Hunter, Teaching and Using Analogy in Law, 2 J. ALWD 151,
155 (2004) (describing it as an explicit similarity likening Juliet to the “light of
his world”); Dedre Gentner, Structure-Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for
Analogy, 7 COGNITIVE SCI. 155, 162 (1983) [hereinafter Gentner, StructureMapping] (describing it as chiefly conveying spatial and emotional relationships
rather than similar features: Juliet appears above him and brings him hope).
5
Although there are obvious connections, the analogy research described
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metaphors spark an analogy-like comparison and the resulting
process of comparison may in turn generate new understanding.6
This new understanding emerges not because new information has
been provided to the reader, but instead because the reader is able
to perceive and interpret the available information in a new way.
The shift is not in what we see (content) but in how we see
(perspective).7
The analysis and suggestions that follow rely on two key
findings from cognitive researchers: (1) metaphors follow a career
path as they evolve from being new to becoming conventional, and
(2) novel metaphors tend to be more capable of generating
knowledge while conventional metaphors tend to provide
categories into which new information is unthinkingly slotted.8
Novel metaphors and characterizations9 are not necessarily “novel”
in the sense of being unique or unusual.10 Instead, they are novel
because they have not previously been used within a specific
context or as a basis for comparison to a particular target. For
example, although property rights are often described as a bundle
of sticks, it might be considered novel to describe privacy rights in
that way.11 But if this novel metaphor were advanced, and if the
here is based on the broader category of analogy rather than the familiar legal
arguments based on analogizing to or distinguishing from a precedential case.
6
Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 227–36 (Dedre Gentner et
al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy] (discussing
results indicating that processing varies as a metaphor moves along a continuum
from novel to conventional).
7
Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination, supra note 1, at 111.
8
Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 227–32.
9
For the purposes of the analogy research, characterizations are a subset of
metaphor.
10
For example, one of the novel metaphors used by Dedre Gentner et al.
was “A Mind is a Kitchen.” Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra
note 6, at 231. In a study of the neurological responses to novel metaphors, the
examples of novel metaphors were more unusual: His handshake was a mumble;
the insults hopped on her tongue. Eileen R. Cardillo et al., From Novel to
Familiar: Tuning the Brain for Metaphors, 59 NEUROIMAGE 3212, 3214, 3219–
20 (2012) (reporting results from study of the neural career of metaphors).
11
See, e.g., Michael J. Minerva Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental
Privacy Right to Raise Their Bundle of Joy, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (1991).
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reader had a stake in what was being argued, the reader would try
to align surface features and underlying relationships found in the
source (a bundle of sticks) with those found in the target (privacy
rights). If the matching of surface features and underlying
relationships seemed to be working (how might privacy rights be
seen as divided over time and among interests and parties?), the
reader would go on to transfer information by inference from the
concept of a bundle of sticks to the concept of privacy rights, thus
generating a new perspective on privacy rights.12
Transferred to legal persuasion, these findings support a
persuasive method intuitively recognized by lawyers: by shifting
the way decision makers perceive and interpret situations involving
people and events, novel characterizations and metaphors are
sometimes able to compete with entrenched stereotypes and
conventional categories. Moreover, the same research may provide
guidance for lawyers working to craft the right kinds of
characterizations and metaphors to meet specific goals.
Drawing on research into social cognition, decision making,
and analogy, this Article will recommend that lawyers turn to
novel characterizations and metaphors to solve one of the difficult
persuasion problems created by the way judges and juries think
and decide. According to social cognition researchers, we perceive
and interpret new information by following a process of schematic
cognition, analogizing the new data we encounter to the schemas
and knowledge structures embedded in our memories. Decisionmaking researchers differentiate between intuitive and reflective
thinking (System 1 and System 2), and they agree that in System 1
decision making, only the most accessible schemas and knowledge
structures are active and available for filtering and framing what
we see. So when we are engaged in System 1 decision making, the
answer to how to think about new information arrives
automatically and intuitively, without deliberation or reflection.
Should the answer be an unhelpful one, recent analogy research
suggests that novel metaphors and characterizations may be used
to prompt alternative schemas or knowledge structures beyond
those that are immediately accessible. If initial matches can be
made between the novel metaphor or characterization and the new
12

See Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, supra note 6, at 243.
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information being perceived, the resulting online processing of
further similarities resembles the more reflective decision making
of System 2, a desirable persuasive result when the immediately
accessible schemas yield an unfavorable answer.
To provide necessary background information before
introducing the more recent findings of analogy researchers, Part I
of this Article will describe the connections between several
strands of cognitive and decision-making research. The research on
schematic cognition13 informs us of the role of embedded
knowledge structures in our unconscious thinking, while research
on intuitive and reflective thinking (System 1 and System 2) shows
us how schematic cognition affects decision making.14 Part II
explores the recent research into the processing of analogy and
metaphor.15 Part III will bring together the findings of all three
bodies of cognitive research to suggest and explore possible
applications to legal persuasion.16
I. OUR ABILITY AND PROPENSITY TO RECOGNIZE PATTERNS LINK
OUR THINKING AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
The same cognitive process that leads to stereotypical thinking
is in play when we identify imaginative solutions to problems.
What we call cognitive bias is the result of our automatic and
intuitive recognition of a familiar pattern.17 Because we are
13

See infra Part I.A. The terms used and concepts summarized in Part I.A
derive primarily from Hofstadter, supra note 3; Anders Kaye, Schematic
Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 565 (2009);
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004).
14
See infra Part I.B, which relies on Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the
Judicial Hunch, 10 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 1 (2013).
15
See infra Part II, which relies on Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like
Analogy, supra note 6.
16
See infra Part III.
17
Implicit or cognitive bias has been the subject of much research and legal
scholarship. See generally B. Keith Payne & Bertram Gawronski, A History of
Implicit Social Cognition: Where Is It Coming From? Where Is It Now? Where
Is It Going?, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT,
THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Bertram Gawronski & B. Keith Payne eds.,
2010); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF.
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deluged with so much data and information, our brain uses a
triage-like approach18 to sort through perceptions and impressions.
We settle on what we recognize as the most relevant features that
fit into the most immediately accessible schema, filtering out other
potentially relevant information. Triage is efficient, but it means
that we “miss” things, and that in some sense, our “intuition” has
closed our minds. When we use this recognition to make a snap
judgment about people, places, things, and the future, the intuition
that guides us may be detrimental to our better judgment.
Moreover, simply providing more information seldom is sufficient
to overcome the cognitive filters that fall into place once we
intuitively recognize a familiar pattern or path.19
What the critics of intuition sometimes miss20 is that intuition
also opens our minds. When there is a question about how to
resolve a difficult problem or achieve a complex goal, our intuitive
L. REV. 969, 972 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–1217 (1995); Justin D. Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 347 (2007); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la
Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 415, 417–18 (2000). Recent articles have addressed the extent to
which bias affects judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit
Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 (2011) (recommending
reforms to help reduce the potential for implicit bias to affect decisionmaking by
immigration judges); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).
18
Kaye, supra note 13, at 600.
19
See Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1228 (concluding that “attempts to
debias our schema-based thinking will be less successful than we would hope
and might expect”).
20
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–43 (2007) (suggesting an “intuition-override”
model of judging in which judges usually make intuitive decisions that only
sometimes are overridden by deliberation). But see Daniel Kahneman & Gary
Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 AM.
PSYCHOL. 515, 525 (2009) (“[A] psychology of judgment and decisionmaking
that ignores intuitive skill is seriously blinkered.”). Balancing this statement, the
authors also conclude that “a psychology of professional judgment that neglects
predictable errors [of intuition] cannot be adequate.” Id.
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recognition of potentially helpful patterns and paths can bring to
mind a range of alternatives. If novel characterizations and
metaphors are used to prompt intuitive recognition of such
alternatives, they may be able to counter entrenched stereotypes
and conventional categories. Rather than changing what the
audience sees by adding information, these novel characterizations
and metaphors work by affecting how the audience perceives and
interprets the existing situation.
To be able to make conscious and deliberate choices about
persuasion, lawyers need to know something about thinking and
decision making.21 This part briefly summarizes the current
conventional wisdom about cognition (how we perceive, interpret,
and organize information) and quickly explores two important
schools of thought about decision making, a process obviously
influenced by the strengths and weaknesses of our thinking
process.

21

“Intuitive problem solving” is the term I will use for what the researchers
refer to as the naturalistic decisionmaking approach or the recognition-primed
decision model. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE
DECISIONS 4–6, 15–30 (1998).
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A. Perception and Interpretation Rely on “Chunking” Data
into Schemas and Other Embedded Knowledge Structures22
Research into the cognitive process indicates that we prefer
coherent and plausible accounts of things and that in order to get
them, we will erase inconsistencies as well as fill in the blanks.23
22

The term “schematic cognition” is adopted from Kaye, supra note 13, at
570. Kaye describes schematic cognition as the process that “reduces the unruly,
constant flood of information available to our senses to schemas and other
related knowledge structures—structured networks of abstract concepts, which
can be stored in long-term memory and referenced to identify and understand
the stimuli in our environment.” Id. For his description of the research relating
to the role of knowledge structures in cognition, Kaye relies on SUSAN T. FISKE
& SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999); DOUGLAS L. MEDIN ET AL.,
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed. 2005); and GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL
COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS (2005). Kaye, supra note 13, at
568 n.2.
In this article, I use the phrase “embedded knowledge structures” to refer to
the whole range of structures that are used for perception and interpretation.
Chen and Hanson differentiate the process of categorization—the classification
of elements, experiences, instances, or arguments into groups—from the
application of schema to the categorized items to draw inferences and make
predictions. Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132–33. They use the term
“knowledge structures” interchangeably with “schema,” and they categorize
schemas as including self schemas, person schemas, role schemas, event
schemas or scripts. Id. Kaye uses the term knowledge structures to include
categories and frameworks for objects, groups of people, roles or characters,
events, and relationships. Kaye, supra note 13, at 570.
In previous articles, I have used the term “embedded knowledge structures”
to refer broadly to the cognitive frameworks constructed by our experiences in
particular contexts. See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures
Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative
and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259
(2009).
23
The impact that schematic cognition can have on juror decision making
is explored in Sara Gordon, Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in
the Application of “Plain Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643
(2013) (assessing the influence of schemas on jury decision making and
recommending alternatives to mitigate the negative effects).
Other authors have noted that Karl Llewellyn reached similar conclusions
before cognitive science and social psychology provided research results to
support them. Llewellyn wrote:
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Starting very early in our lives, we encounter seemingly infinite
amounts and kinds of sensory information. There is so much
information, and it is so various, that we cannot discretely
perceive, interpret, organize, and understand every single item as a
single item. In order to efficiently filter and sort, our brains
develop a series of scans and frames.24
This approach allows us to “get a handle on” the information
we perceive, first by creating frameworks and second by
channeling new information into them.25 We create abstract
structures or frameworks for seemingly related items, and by
analogy, we try to fit new information into the discrete and
Like rules, concepts are not to be eliminated . . . . The sense
impressions which make up what we call observation are
useless unless gathered into some arrangement. Nor can
thought go on without categories.
Moreover, Llewellyn noted that the “realistic approach rests on the observation
that categories and concepts, once formulated and once they have entered into
thought processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and inherent
value which has no foundation in experience.” Once such categories and
concepts have entered into our thinking, they appear “both to suggest the
presence of corresponding data when these data are not in fact present, and to
twist any fresh observation of data into conformity with the terms of the
categories.” Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1252–53 (quoting Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The New Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
453 (1930)).
24
Kaye, supra note 13, at 572–73.
25
Chen and Hanson describe the flow as
beginning with the search for, or acquisition of, new
information based on individuals’ attention. After focusing on
particular pieces of information, individuals then categorize
the information. Once it has been attended to and categorized,
they can then apply a schema to the information, enabling
them to draw inferences and store the information and related
inferences in short- and long-term memory.
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1140. For the overall influence of schemas on
information processing, they rely on Hazel Markus and Robert Zajonc,
“[I]nformation processing may be seen as consisting of schema formation or
activation, of the integration of input with these schemas, and of the updating or
revision of these schemas to accommodate new input.” Hazel Markus & R.B.
Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 150 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d
ed. 1985).
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recognizable slots we have created. When we are successful, we
know how to think and feel about the information without
examining it in detail.26 This lifelong process of “chunking” is an
efficient way to acquire, organize, and use information.27
Researchers say it affects not only our perceptions and
interpretations of what is going on in the world, but also our
emotions, motivations, and decisions.28
The frameworks that human beings create over time depend in
part on their historical and cultural context but also on individual
factors and experiences. Sometimes labeled heuristics, or mental
shortcuts, these frameworks include categories, stereotypes,
metaphors, analogies, scripts, stories, myths, and a range of other
schemas. By a process of comparison, we first chunk things
together and create the frameworks. Again by comparison, we
channel the new data and information we perceive into these
frameworks. The “triggering of prior mental categories by some
kind of input . . . is . . . an act of analogy-making.”29 This
channeling is considered analogical rather than mechanical
because there is usually some degree of mismatch or “slippage”
between the new instance and the prior category.30 Sometimes, the
channeling works the way we usually think about categorization:
we have a prototype in mind, and we fit new items into that slot
26

Hofstadter, supra note 3, at 500. Hofstadter concludes by claiming that
thinking “is a series of leaps involving high-level perception, activation of
concepts in long-term memory, transfer to short-term memory, partial and
context-dependent unpacking of chunks, and then further high-level perception .
. . .” The mechanisms “depend on the transfer of tightly packed mental chunks
from the dormant area of long-term memory into the active area of short-term
memory, and on their being unpacked on arrival, and then scrutinized.” Id. at
536.
27
Hofstadter calls cognition a “relentless lifelong process of chunking—
taking small concepts and putting them together into larger and larger ones.” Id.
at 500.
28
Kaye, supra note 13, at 582–88.
29
Hofstadter, supra note 3, at 503. He describes this analogy-making
metaphorically, “[I]t is the mental mapping onto each other of two entities—one
old and sound asleep in the recesses of long-term memory, the other new and
gaily dancing on the mind’s center stage—that in fact differ from each other in a
myriad of ways.” Id. at 504.
30
Id. at 503–04.
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depending on how similar they are to the prototype. Sometimes,
the channeling appears more “metaphorical”: once we assign
something to a slot, it takes on new meaning that it did not have
before and its fit improves.31
Because channeling itself creates new concepts and networks,
schematic cognition is recursive and continuous. For example,
based on past experience, a “category” is created in the mind.
When we encounter a new piece of information, we sift through
our storehouse of categorical knowledge to identify it, comparing
its features to those associated with our existing categories. We
match the new piece with an existing category of items having
similar features and infer that the existing category is where it
belongs. As the category becomes full of various but similar items,
the category itself may have to expand or evolve.
This process is cognitively efficient. Not only does it reduce
our mental processing burden, it adds information without
additional mental toil. Once new information is fit into a category,
the information acquires the features associated with the category,
so we know how to think about the information and what to do
with it. Because schematic cognition usually operates
automatically, without conscious thought or difficult analysis, the
process is considered to be “intuitive.” Schematic frameworks or
embedded knowledge structures lie around in our long-term
memory until something triggers their retrieval. A prompt or a cue,
also known as a prime or a stimulus, activates one or more of the
embedded knowledge structures, either temporarily or more
permanently. Which schemas or categories will be accessed
depends on a number of factors, including how recently they have
been used, how prominent or novel a particular feature appears to
be, and which emotions and motives are associated with the
choice.32 Once information has been tentatively classified, the
31

See MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE
39–45 (1962).
32
How readily the particular knowledge structure is activated depends on a
number of factors. These include “primacy,” the effect created by the order of
presentation of information (what comes first in a list or a request); “salience,”
the effect created by prominence or novelty (who is the only male in the group);
“priming,” the effect that results from recency or frequency of past reliance
(reading about a related concept just before encountering the new information);
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processor usually will apply the most accessible schema to it.
Similarly, we are likely to fit ambiguous phenomena into
chronically accessible categories, even at the expense of other less
accessible but more fitting categories.33 If there is a slight
mismatch, the processor may adjust either the information or the
schema to make it fit. The processor may also search through less
accessible schema for a better match. “Only if no such schema
exists will [the processor] invest the cognitive energies required to
create new schemas.”34
Once primed, accessible knowledge structures serve as “scans”
or “filters” for perception and “frames” or “lenses” for
interpretation.35 An accessible schema provides a “scanning
pattern,” which leaves us “ready to detect and perceive certain
stimuli” at the expense of others.36 Schemas are associated with the
“confirmation bias:” we are more likely to notice information that
matches the activated schemas or knowledge structures.37 And
once activated, knowledge structures affect how we interpret what
we see. In this way, the schema becomes the person’s “interpretive
frame.”38
B. Our Ability to Recognize Familiar “Chunks” of
Information (or Patterns) is at the Core of Both Intuitive
and Reflective Decision Making
Our intuitive and automatic ability to recognize familiar
patterns links schematic cognition to the decision-making research.
Although this Article will discuss two schools of decision making,
both agree on a definition of intuition that grew out of early studies
and “affect” and “motivation,” the association of emotions and motives. See
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1174–1218.
For an application of priming effects to legal persuasion, see Kathryn M.
Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 82 OR. L. REV. 305, 332–45 (2010).
33
See Kaye, supra note 13, at 580–81.
34
Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1174–75.
35
See Kaye, supra note 13, at 576–86.
36
Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
37
Id. at 579–80.
38
Id. at 582–86.
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of chess masters:
The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given
the expert access to information stored in memory,
and the information provides the answer. Intuition is
nothing more and nothing less than recognition [of a
parallel pattern or path stored in memory].39
The patterns or paths stored in memory are the schemas or
embedded knowledge structures on which schematic cognition
relies. As the schematic cognition research indicates, intuitive
judgments or choices “come to mind on their own, without explicit
awareness of the evoking cues and . . . without an explicit
evaluation of the validity of these cues.”40 As a result, intuitive
judgments appear to be “automatic, arise effortlessly, and often
come to mind without immediate justification.”41
Although they are not dichotomous, there are two distinct
schools of thought about the effects of schematic cognition on
decision making. The first school of thought views intuition—in
this same sense of pattern recognition—as more often leading to
mistakes and overconfidence, while the second school views
intuition as essential to recognizing alternatives for solving a
problem. Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist who won the Nobel
Prize in economics in 2002, is the best-known representative of the
first school, the heuristics and biases branch of research. He and
his long-time partner, Amos Tversky, conducted the first study in
this field in 1969.42 Since 1985, Gary Klein, an experimental
psychologist, has studied and written about the second school, the
field of naturalistic decision making, examining how intuition
triggers good decision making in situations such as firefighting,
nursing, and military leadership.43 In a September 2009 article,
39

Herbert A. Simon, What is an “Explanation” of Behavior, 3 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 149, 155 (1992).
40
Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 519.
41
Id.
42
The original study is included in an appendix in DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). Kahneman’s book focusing on the “biases
of intuition” was a bestseller only a few years after MALCOLM GLADWELL,
BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (focusing on the
wonders of intuition).
43
See KLEIN, supra note 21, at 1–2; see also GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS
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Kahneman and Klein reported that after several years of
collaboration, they had reached agreement on the circumstances
that would allow intuition to yield good decision making.44 Still,
their perspectives are very different: heuristics and biases
research45 concentrates on the “overconfident and biased
impressions” that grow out of intuition; Klein’s naturalistic
decision-making research focuses on the expertise that may lead to
“true intuitive skill.”46
As a convenient way of describing a continuum of processes
that we draw upon as cognitive demands change, heuristics and
biases researchers divide our thinking and reasoning processes into
intuitive and analytical categories: System 1 (thinking “fast” or
intuitively) and System 2 (thinking “slow” or analytically). System
1 “is rapid, intuitive, emotional, and prone to bias,” while System 2
“is more deliberate, more reflective, more dispassionate, and (it is
said) more accurate.”47 Although the so-called “dual-process”
model of information gathering and information processing has
been around for some time,48 much of the recent visibility for
System 1 and System 2 thinking can be attributed to Kahneman’s
2011 publication of Thinking, Fast and Slow.
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(2009).
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Though much of the book highlights the inaccurate judgments
that result from fast (or intuitive) thinking, fast thinking often is
not only good, but also essential to our lives. Knowing that the
green light means go without having to think about it means that
we can safely walk across the street within the seconds allowed by
the timed traffic signal. System 1 routinely guides our thoughts and
actions, and we continue to follow System 1 because it often serves
us well. On the other hand, System 1 is the source of “implicit
bias,” the result of unconscious mental processes that affect
perception, impressions, and judgment because of implicit
memories, perceptions, attitudes, and stereotypes.
Compared with System 2 thinking, System 1 thinking appears
more related to affect or emotion: it “represents events in the form
of concrete exemplars and schemas inductively derived from
emotionally significant past experiences.”49 Which system kicks in
for a particular situation depends both on the characteristics of the
situation and the emotions affected: when the situations are the
same, “the greater the emotional involvement, the greater the shift
in the balance of influence from the rational [System 2] to the
experiential system [System 1].”50 System 1’s reliance on affect
and emotion makes it “a quicker, easier, and more efficient way to
navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous
world.” In addition, failing to listen to System 1 can lead decisions
astray when they include an emotional component.51
On the other hand, slow thinking is considered essential during
at least some parts of the process of making more complex
decisions. Even a relatively simple decision such as choosing
whether to look to the right or to the left for oncoming traffic
before walking across the street might involve System 2 thinking.
If a pedestrian from the United States found himself in London at a
crosswalk that did not have a sign instructing him to “look right,”
he should reflect on the choice rather than following the intuitive
and usually correct response—to look first to the left. According to
49

Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and
Rational Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 819 (1994).
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the heuristics and biases school of thought, application of System 2
thinking almost always improves decision making. From this
perspective, the quick impressions created by System 1 will control
our judgments and decisions unless the more deliberate thinking of
System 2 takes over to modify or override the System 1
responses.52
While Kahneman has “spent much of his career running
experiments in which intuitive judgment was commonly found to
be flawed,” Klein has spent most of his career studying expert
decision making and “thinking about ways to promote reliance on
expert intuition.”53 The kind of “intuition” Klein advocates is not
the so-called gut reaction that leads to instant knowledge that
someone is telling the truth or lying, but the flash of recognition
that comes from a cue alerting the problem solver to an analogous
pattern, allowing the expert to draw on past or known experiences
to come up with parallel patterns or paths. Through his research
involving a range of experts, Klein found that in real-life complex
situations, experts rely on intuition to solve problems. They are
able to solve problems not because their intuition is necessarily
correct, but because intuition is how they identify workable options
to test.54
The intuitive problem-solving model that Klein describes
blends two processes: (1) how decision makers “size up” a
situation and thus recognize a possibly workable course of action,
and (2) how they evaluate the course of action by simulating or
imagining its results.55 Klein points out that this process differs
from the rational choice model of decision making (the decision
maker lines up the pluses and minuses of each option and decides
52
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by weighing them) in several ways. First, rather than comparing
options, the decision maker focuses on assessing a situation and
finding familiar features. Second, in contrast with the more formal
comparison implied by the rational choice model, the decision
maker quickly evaluates possible courses of action by imagining
how they would be carried out. Finally, rather than the best option,
the decision maker looks for the first workable option. Because the
decision maker often finds the first option to be workable, the
decision maker usually generates and evaluates alternatives one at
a time. By imagining what will happen as the first workable option
is being carried out, the expert decision maker is able to identify
weaknesses and make adjustments.56
In the Klein model of intuitive problem solving, experts engage
in both an intuitive process “that brings promising solutions to
mind and a deliberate activity in which the . . . solution is mentally
simulated . . . .”57 In the Kahneman model, System 2 is involved in
careful reasoning and decision making as well as in continuous
monitoring. For the heuristics and biases researchers, “[w]hen
there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be wrong, System 2
can impose a different strategy . . . .”58 To sum up, intuition opens
minds for further thinking in the Klein approach, but intuition
exists to be corrected in the Kahneman model.
II. WHEN WE PROCESS NOVEL METAPHORS, WE MAY BE
REQUIRED TO ENGAGE IN MORE REFLECTIVE DECISION
MAKING
Analogy and metaphor take different linguistic forms, but they
work in similar ways. The linguistic difference is very simply
illustrated as follows:
Analogy: A is like B (Juliet is like the sun.)
Metaphor: A is B (Juliet is the sun.)
In both instances, A is the target domain, and B is the source
56
57
58

Id. at 30.
Kahneman & Klein, supra note 20, at 519.
Id.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

164

domain. When the purpose of using an analogy or a metaphor is to
explain, the target (A) typically is the “new” concept or the more
abstract idea, and the source (B) is the more familiar or concrete
thing. The analogy or the metaphor should make A more
understandable for one of several reasons: because B is a similar,
but more familiar or more concrete example; because B provides a
more abstract category of examples into which A seems to fit; or
because B helps the reader see A in a new light. The inferences
that derive from analogy are similar to metaphorical inferences:
“[b]oth analogy and metaphor involve a similarity relation between
two objects, and the similarity relation transfers meaning from one
object (the source) to another (the target).”59
Recent analogy research suggests that the important distinction
is not between analogy and metaphor but between conventional
metaphor and novel metaphor.60 This distinction is elusive, in part
because novel metaphors may over time become conventional.61
The difference may usefully be viewed as akin to the difference
between a poetic metaphor and a propositional metaphor.62 A
propositional metaphor, although not literally true, suggests that
one thing should be seen as and treated as if it were another (the
First Amendment is a wall of separation). In contrast, poetic
metaphor (all the world’s a stage) proposes a shift in viewpoint or
perspective, a new take, a way of seeing that makes you consider a
familiar concept in a new light.63
Both conventional and novel metaphors may serve as schemas
or embedded knowledge structures to be pulled from memory
when needed. The use of conventional metaphors appears to
support System 1 thinking: when you repeat a conventional
metaphor, you are hoping that the audience will “automatically”
59
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accept that the target fits into the category slot of the source. The
processing of a novel metaphor, on the other hand, begins with the
automatic, intuitive thinking of System 1—recognition of a
familiar pattern or path—but the audience is then required to work
through an alignment, comparison, and inference process that
blends intuitive and analytical (or more reflective) thinking.64
A. How Do We Process Analogies?
For the analogy researchers, analogy does not work in the same
way as a literal similarity or a category-like abstraction.65 For
example, in the literal similarity—The X12 star system in the
Andromeda galaxy is like our solar system—there are literal
similarities both in the characteristics of the objects involved (the
X12 star is yellow and mid-sized, as is our sun) and in the
relationships among them (the planets revolve around the X12 star,
as they do around our sun).66 But the analogy—The hydrogen atom
is like our solar system—depends mostly on similarities in the
structure of the relationships in the target and the source: an
electron revolves around the nucleus like the planets revolve
around the sun. Some characteristics of the objects may be literally
similar, but it is irrelevant that others are not.67 Conversely, the
abstraction—The hydrogen atom is a central force system—
depends only on similarities in relationships.68
The idea that human cognition could be studied “as a form of
computation” led to research into cognitive processes, including
perception, memory, and problem solving.69 The broader study of
analogy by cognitive scientists came later, starting in about 1980.70
64
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This exploration of the relationships among learning, memory, and
reasoning grew out of the emergence of an alternative to rule-based
reasoning that focused on the usefulness of retrieving “cases or
analogs stored in long-term memory when deriving solutions to
novel problems.”71 Psychologist Dedre Gentner and her colleagues
proposed much of the current model of analogy processing.72 They
found that (1) the similarities in analogy lie mostly within the
relationships present in both the target and source domains rather
than in the features of the individual objects within those domains,
and (2) some analogical similarities depend on higher-order
relations, or relations between relations.73 Others studying the role
of analogy in problem solving have developed models and theories
suggesting that multiple constraints affect our assessments of the
effectiveness of analogy.74
The analogy studies appear to have reached a consensus on
some important elements of a hybrid model of analogy processing,
the “structural alignment” model.75 This model incorporates
alignment (between the target and the source) and projection (from
the source to the target). According to the model, the first step in
processing an analogy is that one or more relevant analogs (or
schema) are accessed from long-term memory. The processor (or
reader) then begins comparing the source and the target to identify
matches and to align the corresponding parts of the target and the
source. After that, the reader maps source attributes onto the target.
The mapping allows analogical inferences derived from the source
to transfer to the target. These inferences are evaluated and adapted
to fit the target if necessary. In addition, new categories and
schemas may be generated and new understandings of old schemas
may be added to memory banks.76
While processing an analogy, the alignment and projection (or
mapping) may involve any or all of the following: (1) objects or
features of the target and the source as well as the properties of
71
72
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those objects or features; (2) relationships between the objects or
features of the target and the source; and (3) higher-order
relationships between the relationships. During the alignment
process, as discussed above, the reader looks for similarities while
comparing the various elements of the two situations. But there are
constraints on analogy making, primarily constraints of
consistency and systematicity. Not only must there be a one-to-one
correspondence between the aligned elements in the target and the
source, but also there must be parallel connections. In addition to
structural consistency, alignment is guided by the principle of
systematicity: a system connected by causal relationships is
preferred over independent matches. Thus, the reader does not
project inferences that are unconnected but instead only those that
“complete the common system of relationships.”77 In other words,
the target and the source must be comparable based on “clustered
groups of relations which are able to explain why the system works
as it does.”78 According to Gentner, this occurs because of “our
tacit preference for coherence and deductive power in interpreting
analogy.”79
The multi-constraint theory of analogy affects the lawyer’s use
of analogies in legal persuasion. Dan Hunter describes these as
constraints at the surface or feature level, constraints at the
structural or relationship level, and constraints of purpose.80 At
least some surface-level similarity appears to be necessary between
the features of the source and of the target. In fact, simple factmatching often appears to be the basis of legal arguments based on
analogy.81 Still, surface-level similarity is only the first step in
77
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analogy: many things can be argued to be similar to one another at
the level of surface features. The structural constraint requires a
finding of consistent structural parallels between the target and the
source. If the surface level describes objects, the structural level
describes relationships between or among objects. The final
constraint is the purpose for using the analogy, which, as Hunter
points out, may be particularly important in using analogies for
legal persuasion. If a particular analogy helps one side’s case more
than another, the lawyer’s purpose will influence others’
perceptions of whether the analogy is good or not.82
B. How Do We Process Metaphors?
Like Aristotle, analogy researchers now believe that
“comparison is the fundamental process that drives metaphor.”83
Moreover, they conclude that “[n]ovel metaphors are understood
only by comparison,” and even though “[c]onventional metaphors
can be understood by accessing stored abstractions, . . . these
metaphoric abstractions are a product of past comparisons.”84 This
conclusion differs from other current and traditional models of
metaphor processing.85
For example, the model of juxtaposition suggested that
metaphor works by contrasting the target (Juliet) with the source
(that is, with any another object, event, or situation, like the sun).
The juxtaposition was thought to nudge us to attend to previously
unnoticed features of the target. This model, however, failed to
explain how metaphors could generate new information.86
“Category-transfer” models proposed that metaphor works by
forming ad hoc categories, abstracting from a prototype of the
source, and then transferring to the target. When we think of life as
a journey, we derive abstract categories from the concrete features
of a journey to produce a more general schema for understanding
sufficient when a judge must decide many cases in a short period of time).
82
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life. Category-transfer models explained why metaphor can help
organize our understanding of an unfamiliar target, but they did not
account for the different effects of applying the same source to
different targets.87 In contrast to the category-transfer model, the
“feature-matching” model aligned the source and the target and
directly compared their features. The feature-matching model
could not, however, explain some of metaphor’s broader
organizational effects or how metaphors created new information.
An emerging consensus supports the application of the
analogy-processing model of “structural alignment” to the
processing of metaphor.88 Dedre Gentner and her colleagues have
studied how we process what Gentner calls “extended metaphoric
systems,” such as argument as container, love as a journey.89 The
basic explanation they sought was whether people “possess largescale conceptual metaphors” that are ready-made or whether such
conceptual metaphors are understood because mappings are
“constructed online,” as they are in analogy processing. 90 Their
results indicated that the online-construction, structure-mapping
theory best explains the processing of novel metaphors: that is,
these “metaphors are processed as structural alignments, based on
some initial relational commonalities.”91 After that, “further
inferences are projected from the more concrete or familiar
[source] to target.”92 In other words, when a reader encounters a
novel metaphor, the reader recognizes parallel features and
structures shared by the target and the source, and then the reader
creates new understanding by projecting inferences from the
source to the target.93
Gentner and her co-authors concluded that the same “basic
87
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processes of analogy are at work in metaphor . . . structural
alignment, inference projection, progressive abstraction, and rerepresentation . . . .”94 Their research suggested that as metaphors
move from being novel to becoming conventional, the reader
switches her mental processing of the metaphor from making a
comparison to fitting an unknown experience into a prior
categorization.95 As a result, according to these researchers, when
the reader is interpreting a novel metaphor, she is engaged in
creating meaning, but when the reader is interpreting a
conventional metaphor, she is retrieving meaning from a mental
storeroom.96
We can see something of the evolution of metaphorical
processing from comparison to categorization by examining the
career of the now-conventional metaphor that the mind is a
computer. When computers were new, some scientists had
suggested the mirror-image metaphor—the computer is a brain—
as a way to describe and explain a machine that was capable of
processing symbols, something that previously had been done only
by human beings.97
Later, when scientists began studying the mind as an
information-processing mechanism, it was in part because the
mind had become the target of the metaphor (the more abstract
concept to be explained), and the computer now served as the more
concrete or familiar source for transferring understanding.98 When
this later metaphor—the mind is a computer—was first used, it
was novel, that is, the source domain (the computer) had not
previously been applied to the target domain (the mind). To
understand the metaphor, the reader had to try to align the
characteristics and relationships existing within a computer with
those existing within a mind: for example, both appear to take in
94
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data and to process it before producing some kind of report.99 In
the beginning of its career as a novel image, the mind is a
computer metaphor generated not only a new way of seeing but
also a new way of studying the mind.100 Now that the metaphor has
become conventional, saying that the mind is a computer appears
to state only the obvious—that the mind fits into the category of
an information-processing mechanism.101
Although Gentner and her colleagues found that individual
metaphors may evolve during their careers from alignment-based
processing (side-by-side comparison of source and target) to
projection-based processing (directional projection from source to
target), their findings appear to contradict some aspects of the
cognitive metaphor theory of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.
Lakoff and Johnson argued that domain-level metaphors construct
thought, primarily through one-way projection from source to
target.102 They concluded that “metaphor shapes thought by
mapping onto the new experience the structures, inferences, and
reasoning methods of the old.”103 In this view, rather than drawing
on existing similarities between the source and the target,
metaphorical processing creates similarities by providing a source
structure through which to view the target. Thus, when you use a
conceptual metaphor such as justice is balancing, the reader
invokes an already-stored conceptual mapping and applies it to
justice.
Lakoff and Johnson argued not only that metaphor creates
99
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cognitive content but also that metaphor is the fundamental process
in both thought and expression.104 They were persuaded by their
research—much of it addressing the use of a concrete, experienced
source domain to structure and understand a more abstract target
domain—that metaphor is absorbed through long, constant, and
unconscious experience. The resulting conceptual metaphors
provide tacit knowledge that has become embedded through
unavoidable and repeated experience.105 Some critics of Lakoff
and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor dispute the
overarching claim that metaphor is the fundamental feature of
thought.106 These critics point out that metaphor is not the only
language process that works in a similar way. Other stored
knowledge structures—including schema, analogy, and narrative—
also create new meaning by mapping the source domain on top of
the target or by transferring features from the source to the
target.107
Based on their studies of analogy and metaphor, Gentner and
her co-authors concluded that the Lakoff and Johnson theory of
how metaphors construct meaning might apply to conventional
metaphors but not to novel ones.108 Specifically, rather than
alignment and projection moving solely from the source to the
target, Gentner and her colleagues found that understanding a
metaphor begins with a symmetrical alignment process. Once an
alignment is found, then further inferences are directionally
projected from source to target. That is, directional inference
building—from source to target—arises after the initial stage, but
the initial stage is side-by-side.109 When we try to understand a
novel metaphor, we structurally align concrete or literal
representations of the source and target. As we repeat these
104
105
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comparisons over time, we can abstract a more general
metaphorical meaning, and we begin to associate the abstract
meaning with the source term.110 Through repeated instances of
structural alignment, we inductively create metaphoric
categories.111
Novel metaphors use sources that refer to specific concepts not
yet associated with more general categories. They are interpreted
as comparisons between features and relationships associated with
both the literal source and the literal target. Conventional
metaphors involve sources that refer both to a literal concept and to
an associated metaphoric category. A novel metaphor, according to
this research, is processed by aligning the literal senses of both
terms, while a conventional metaphor may be interpreted either by
aligning the target with the literal source or by aligning the target
with the source’s abstract metaphoric category.112
For the purposes of legal persuasion, what this suggests is that
a reader who is asked to interpret a novel metaphor will be
engaged in the creation of meaning, while the reader who is
confronted with a conventional metaphor will do nothing more
than retrieve an abstract metaphoric category. Thus, when it was a
novel metaphor (and phrased as an analogy), processing the
meaning of A mind is like a computer involved an active and
reflective comparison of the source and the target. But as the
metaphor became conventional, understanding the use of A mind is
a computer became an automatic process of categorization. The
application of this finding to legal persuasion is discussed in Part
III.
C. How Does Metaphor Differ from Analogy?
Analogical reasoning that compares case precedents is an
obvious example of lawyers’ use of analogy to persuade. But
analogy has many persuasive applications beyond the use of prior
precedents “to predict, explain or justify the outcome of the

110
111
112

Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229–30.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

174

currently undecided case.”113 The discussion so far has emphasized
the similarities between metaphor and analogy: both are ways of
seeing one thing as another, and both are capable of transferring
inferences from one domain to another. But there also are
differences relevant to those interested in legal persuasion. For
example, Dan Hunter distinguishes between metaphor and analogy
on the ground that analogy has an explicit predictive or
explanatory effect.114 Overall, metaphor appears more varied, more
ambiguous and thus more flexible, and more tied to emotion than
analogy.
First, there are many more kinds of metaphor than of
analogy.115 Some metaphors appear to be based on analogical
comparisons of relationships between aspects of the source and the
target or on similar features or attributes. My job is a jail is an
example of a metaphor that appears to be based on an analogical
comparison of relationships rather than of surface features. On the
other hand, his eyes were burning coals is an example of a
metaphor apparently based on a comparison of features rather than
of relationships.116 The analogy researchers have found that
metaphors vary more in structure than do analogies, involving
matches between features or relationships or both, and that they
can violate the constraint of structural consistency. Metaphors also
may include very complex blends.117 Though metaphors may be
based on similarities between relationships or between features,
some studies indicate that when people interpret metaphors, as
when they interpret analogies, they tend to rely more on
relationships than common features.118 Even though metaphor is
often used for novel and vivid nonliteral comparisons (unlike
analogy), the term is also applied to metaphorical systems that are
so familiar they have become invisible. While some metaphors are
considered “dead,” because they no longer convey any nonliteral
meaning, others have become conventional systems of
113
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reasoning.119
Second, compared with analogy, metaphor appears to be a
more nonliteral use of language and thus more ambiguous and
flexible. The author of a metaphor is able to advance positions
without being held to them. When you use a metaphor, the listener
usually understands that you have said one thing but that you likely
have meant another (even if the listener does not understand your
meaning). When you use an analogy, it is hard to deny that you
have explicitly stated that the corporation is like a person and so
you may have to provide supporting arguments to establish the
similarities. When you use a metaphor, you can deny that you
intended to argue for any explicit similarities: when I said the
corporation is a person, I meant only that a person is an easier
way to visualize an abstract entity.
Finally, metaphor is more associated with emotion and
expression than analogy. Although metaphors are also used to
explain and predict, analogy is mostly confined to explanatorypredictive contexts.120 Poetic power is rarely attributed to analogy,
but the poetic power of metaphor is often acknowledged. This
power is thought to arise from metaphor’s invitation to see one
thing “as another,” providing us with a novel perspective and
generating new information in the process. In other words, we
don’t see Juliet “as” the sun. But something happens to our view of
Juliet that is similar to our viewing the classical Gestalt figure in
which, depending on your perspective, one of two different women
seems to appear.121 The Gestalt figure always contains the
elements of both a young woman and an old woman, and the
elements themselves do not change. Instead, they slip and slide
before our eyes until they click into place. Although we now see
something we did not see before, it is not because we have
received new information: “Rather, the difference is experiential,
intuitive, and holistic.”122
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Id. See also Hunter, supra note 59, at 152.
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III. USED

FOR LEGAL PERSUASION, NOVEL CHARACTERIZATIONS
AND METAPHORS MAY TAP INTO ALTERNATIVE SCHEMAS,
PROMPT MORE REFLECTIVE COMPARISON, AND ACTIVATE
OTHER PERSUASIVE KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES

Sometimes the automatic operation of System 1 thinking—
simply pulling a familiar pattern from memory—will resolve a
legal problem to the client’s satisfaction. The lawyer who must
overcome the easily accessible answers of System 1 thinking in
order to persuade faces a more difficult task. Substantial research
indicates that it is very difficult to overcome System 1 thinking by
providing new information.123 Still, we all know of instances when
the “content of our categories”—even the “content” of our
stereotypes—has changed significantly over time.124 For example:
At the end of the nineteenth century, the illegal
immigration problem in America had a Chinese
face. . . . And now, the racial meaning ascribed to
the very same body is often “model minority.”125
Even though the addition of new information may be able to
reshape our embedded knowledge frameworks over time, the
process appears unpredictable, lengthy, and incremental. Rather
than attempting to reshape schemas and knowledge structures by
providing new information, the cognitive research discussed here
supports the use of novel characterizations and metaphors to
generate alternative ways of perceiving and interpreting the
existing information—to shift how rather than what we see. When
lawyers construct a theory of the case, they consciously or
intuitively use or avoid embedded knowledge structures. These
structures scan and filter what the audience perceives, and they can
be used to frame and channel how the reader interprets those
perceptions. As both filter and frame, the range of available
knowledge structures within legal persuasion likely includes (1)
123

See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132 (explaining that
additional information is rarely enough to change judgments that flow
automatically from schema recognition).
124
Kang, supra note 17, at 1536 (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995)).
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ideographs (individual words or terms that represent a collection of
societal values and beliefs such as liberty, equality, neutrality,
freedom, property);126 (2) characterizations (words or phrases that
describe easily recognized social agents within the culture and
become the “building blocks of narratives,” including such terms
as Boy Scouts, Founders, Liberals, Southerners);127 (3) narratives
and myths (recognizable, structured plots that organize and make
understandable a series of events, including, for example, the
quest, overcoming the monster, rags to riches);128 and (4)
metaphors and analogies (the often-concrete sources used to
familiarize us with and help us understand new and abstract ideas,
such as a marketplace of ideas, a sliding scale, or a balancing
test).129
The use of novel characterizations and metaphors is supported
not only by the cognitive research discussed here but also by
language experts and philosophers who have sketched the ways
that characterizations and metaphors can prompt new ways of
seeing.130 For example, Elisabeth Camp131 writes that new ways of
seeing may be brought about through a process involving
characterizations and perspectives.132 In Camp’s view, one
characterization is used to filter, frame, or structure another.133 I
could, for example, use my characterization of a lioness to
126

This list is adapted from a list of units for critical rhetorical analysis in
Marouf Hasian Jr., The Importance of Critical Legal Rhetorics, in LEGAL
MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA’S RHETORICAL CULTURE 1, 14 (2000).
See also Michael Calvin McGee, The “Ideograph”: A Link Between Rhetoric
and Ideology, 66 Q. J. SPEECH 1, 6–7 (1980).
127
Hasian, supra note 126, at 14–15.
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Id. at 15.
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15.
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This part draws on Berger, Metaphor in Law, supra note 62.
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Camp is a philosophy professor who writes that her interests lie “in the
overlap between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.” See
Elisabeth Camp, UNIV. OF PA., http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~campe/ (last modified
Mar. 21, 2011).
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structure my characterization of Hillary Clinton, the former U.S.
Senator and Secretary of State. This process would begin with the
most prominent and central features in the framing characterization
(the lioness), seek matches for them within the subject
characterization (Clinton), and then highlight the prominence and
centrality of the matched features. Restructuring one
characterization in light of another brings an intuitive result: if it
works, you will come to “see” Clinton as a lioness without
to
Camp,
knowing how your insight came about. According
metaphorical perspectives have the same effect, but they are more
general and not tied to a particular subject: “a perspective provides
an intuitive, holistic principle for organizing our thoughts about
some topic.”134 It does so “by imposing a complex structure of
relative prominence on them, so that some features stick out in our
minds while others fade into the background, and by making some
features especially central to explaining others.”135 For instance, a
perspective might be a political orientation or a general worldview
that individuals are responsible for helping themselves. Like a
characterization, a perspective may carry attitudes, emotions, and
values. Rather than a complete, complex thought, a perspective
provides a tool for thinking that “helps us to do things with the
thoughts we have: to make quick judgments based on what’s most
important, to grasp intuitive connections, and to respond
emotionally.”136 Perspective also “provides us with a ‘way to go
on,’ incorporating new thoughts about the focal topic and often
about related topics as well.”137
According to Camp, the process of metaphorically “seeing as”
is not a what but a how. Rather than changing what exists, “[i]t
imaginatively alters how we structure and color our thoughts about
what is so.”138 Seeing a target through a characterization requires
the viewer to re-structure her thinking to make the relevant features
play an appropriately prominent or central role. Trying on a
perspective requires the viewer to re-configure her patterns of
134
135
136
137
138

Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination, supra note 1, at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
Id. (alteration in original).
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thought about a broader collection of topics.139
A. Using Novel Characterizations to Tap into Alternative
Schemas and Complicate Group Stereotypes
Like other unconscious uses of schematic cognition,
stereotyping helps us manage information overload. Stereotypes
are nothing more than “schemas for groups of people.”140 Because
we cannot process and interpret all the data we perceive about each
individual, stereotypes allow us to efficiently (if inaccurately)
identify the person we have encountered, make assumptions and
predictions about that person, and plan our own behavior in
response. Stereotyping illustrates that schematic thinking is usually
unconscious and difficult to control, and that social and cultural
forces are very much involved when we construct these embedded
knowledge structures.
Both explicit and indirect approaches have been suggested as
ways to “neutralize” or counter the effects of schema or
stereotypes associated with individuals who might be perceived as
members of disfavored groups. When a group stereotype is
expected to have negative effects on the person being represented,
an attorney might point out the shortcomings of the categorization
and explicitly argue for more individually appropriate
characterizations.141 More indirect arguments may affect the
emotions or self-images of audience members or may prime an
audience with ideals of fairness and equality.142
The cognitive research discussed in this Article suggests
139

Id. at 111–16.
Kaye, supra note 13, at 593. They are “expectancies about a social
group,” and they include “beliefs about the probability that particular traits,
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another approach: use of a novel characterization or metaphor—
one that already exists but has not previously been associated with
this target—to shift the decision maker’s perspective. Within any
decision-making context, multiple and various schemas might be
triggered. Which of the possible schemas is selected to “actively
influence [an] interaction depend[s] on numerous variables, such
as primacy (what gets activated first), salience (which schemas
catch attention), accessibility (which schema cues can be retrieved
in memory easily, perhaps because of recent primacy), and
individuating information.”143
In a recent article, Professor Pam Wilkins illustrated the use of
novel characterizations and metaphors to counter role stereotypes
affecting death-penalty defendants.144 As she noted, criminal
prosecutions often hinge on a master narrative that centers on the
stock character of the violent criminal. In this narrative,
“individual lawbreakers are seen as the primary or exclusive causal
locus of criminal behavior; they alone are responsible for their
actions and, collectively, for the overall magnitude of the ‘crime
problem.’”145 The law-breaker is viewed as making “entirely free
choices” and making them “willfully and selfishly . . . despite the
perpetrators’ full knowledge of their hurtful consequences.” As a
result, the criminal’s behavior is “a reflection of the inherent
‘badness’ of those who engage in it.”146
Confronted with this stock character, criminal defense
attorneys often try to open up the lens or extend the timeline to
look at the defendant’s life story beyond the defendant’s criminal
acts. But at least some mitigation testimony may be harmful:
“traditional mitigation narratives about defendants’ dysfunctional
family lives may reinforce jurors’ racial prejudices, undermine
defense attempts to create juror empathy for capital defendants
who happen to be black, and ultimately increase the likelihood of
death sentences against such defendants.”147 The schema that white
143
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jurors construct for the “black family” may include expectations of
poverty, abuse, neglect, and other pathology. If that schema is
already in the jurors’ heads, then the defendant’s life in such an
environment does not help the jury to understand the trouble at the
story’s core: it’s just another stock script.148
Professor Wilkins offers examples of different means for
countering implicit biases, drawing on the opening and closing
statements during the penalty phase of the trial of Alan Quinones
after he had been convicted of racketeering, drug trafficking, and
the murder of a confidential informant.149 The evidence suggested
that Quinones was a “relatively large scale dealer of cocaine and
heroin” and that Quinones had spent some time looking for the
informant and threatening to kill him.150 According to Professor
Wilkins, the defense attorney was able to counter the violent
criminal schemas in play by (1) his use of an initial metaphor
(child of God) to “prime” the jurors to consider fairness and
equity;151 (2) his presentation of Quinones as a counterstereotypical exemplar;152 and (3) his invocation of competing role
schemas, depicting Quinones as a protective father figure and a
first-generation immigrant.153
The lawyer’s use of the father-and-protector schema is an
example of a novel characterization. That is, the father-andprotector schema already exists, but it is not typically applied to
violent criminals. The metaphor-processing research discussed
earlier suggests that when confronted with this novel
characterization, a juror might try to match up the characteristics of
the defendant with the characteristics of a protective father. If the
juror finds initial matches in literal similarities between the
features of the defendant and those of a protective father, other
favorable characteristics of the protective father might transfer as
well. In other words, the defendant would benefit from helpful
Mitigation Discourse, Black Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 171, 188–92 (2009)).
148
Id. at 347–48.
149
Id. at 349–58.
150
Id. at 350.
151
Id. at 351–52.
152
Id. at 352–53.
153
Id. at 353–58.
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inferences provided by the protective-father schema. The
protective-father schema adds to the juror’s perspective of the
defendant the knowledge that protective fathers will use whatever
methods they have available.154 Within this schema, even unlawful
activity may be seen as understandable and deserving of respect.155
As already noted, in this example, the novel characterization is
used to provide the decision maker with a new perspective (rather
than with new information). By encouraging the decision maker to
look beyond the most immediately accessible framework to
knowledge that might be derived from alternative schemas, the
novel characterization is designed to shift or broaden the decision
maker’s view of the same information.
B. Using Novel Metaphors to Prompt More Reflective
Comparison and Counteract Automatic Categorization
The use of a conventional metaphor is thought to impose the
structure of the source onto the target. Once the target has been fit
into the appropriate metaphorical category, mapping focuses a
spotlight on some aspects of a concept, reflects other aspects, and
eclipses still others.156 Metaphor carries over from the source to the
target attributes, inferences, frameworks, reasoning methods, and
evaluation standards.157
In the following example, drawn from the briefs filed in Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky,158 the conventional metaphor is the corporation is a
person. This metaphor has become so conventional that it goes
unnoticed. For example, Justice Stevens automatically referred to
the corporation being sued as having human qualities: Nike was
besieged with allegations; Nike was participating in a public
154

Id. at 356–57.
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debate about Nike as a good corporate citizen.159 Based on the
analogy research cited earlier, this reference indicates that the
metaphor was automatically and unconsciously processed and that
the entity of the corporation was simply fit into the category of
persons, with all the ensuing implications.
In the lawsuit originally filed as Kasky v. Nike, a critic of
Nike’s labor practices in foreign countries sued Nike under
California statutes that allow private lawsuits to enforce
prohibitions against false advertising and unfair competition.160
Plaintiff Marc Kasky alleged that “Nike, for the purpose of
inducing consumers to buy its products, made false representations
of fact about the conditions under which they are made.”161 Nike
responded that the First Amendment protected Nike’s
communications because they were part of a debate about a public
issue.162 The lower courts agreed and dismissed the lawsuit, but the
California Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Nike’s
representations were commercial speech and thus subject to
regulation.163 After the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,
thirty-four briefs (including thirty-one amicus briefs) were filed
and oral arguments were heard. A few months later, the Court
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.164 In a subsequent
settlement, Nike agreed to pay $1.5 million to a consumer
advocacy group.165
In the briefs they filed, both sides in the dispute assumed that
Nike was the kind of speaker whose representations might be
protected by the First Amendment. Nike and its supporters
projected as the governing image of the lawsuit an attempt by the
plaintiff to hobble one speaker in a public debate: the briefs even
raised concerns that Nike would be placed on an unequal footing
159
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with its critics. Nike’s personhood was used to obscure any
distinction between the corporation and any other speaker.166
The attorneys representing Kasky did not try to displace the
corporation-is-a-person metaphor. That acceptance seemingly
made it difficult to argue that Nike was distinguishable from other
competitors in the marketplace of ideas or other participants in a
debate.167 Through its use of a novel metaphor, the plaintiff might
have paved the way for an argument that the advertising and public
relations products that Nike manufactures, distributes, and sells are
not speech at all. For example, one amicus brief set out the novel
characterization (that is, a familiar characterization, but one that
was new in this context) that Nike should be viewed as a
manufacturer of products even when the product is speech. These
amicus brief lawyers suggested that Nike’s corporate public
relations products should be seen “as” manufactured images,
marketing tools, and cultivated commodities. Rather than Nike
being engaged in speech, this brief described Nike as “engaged in a
publicity campaign.”168 The brief continued to use metaphors from
activities other than speaking: “Nike Has Manufactured An Image
of Social Responsibility As A Means of Promoting Product Sales”;
“Image Promotion Is An Essential Aspect Of Product Promotion”;
and “Nike Has Cultivated A Corporate Image Of Social
Progressivity As A Marketing Tool To Promote Product Sales.”169
According to the analogy research, the use of this novel
metaphor might lead to more reflective decision making (rather
than more automatic categorization). That is, if the audience is able
to align the characteristics and relationships associated with
manufacturers and products with those associated with Nike and its
public relations campaign, the audience might also project
inferences from manufacturing to public relations. Once Nike’s
representations are viewed as cars or shoes, the projected
166
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inferences suggest that they can be seen “as” part of a process that
involves no First Amendment values at all. Instead, the public
relations products that Nike manufactures and disseminates are like
any other product the corporation makes. Like any other product,
these products are made by corporate employees who are
responding to corporate designs and directions; the content of the
product is influenced not by self-expression or enhancement of
knowledge but instead by sales potential. Therefore, like any other
product, their manufacture, distribution, and sale should be subject
to state regulation to protect the public.170
In this example, the novel metaphor (Nike’s representations are
products) is used to prompt more reflective thinking in an effort to
counter the automatic process of categorization (Nike is a person).
Thus, the novel metaphor is designed to persuade the decision
maker to more actively compare the features and relationships of
the source and target domains, leading to a more desirable
persuasive outcome.
C. Using a Novel Characterization to Activate the More
Persuasive Knowledge Structure Provided by a Master
Story171
In addition to prompting an audience to consider the
perspective of an alternative schema or to engage in more
reflective comparison, novel characterizations and metaphors may
be used to activate related knowledge structures. In the following
example, the Supreme Court’s use of a novel characterization
activated the persuasive master story provided by a canonical
opinion, Brown v. Board of Education.172
170
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171
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Applied to human beings, the label “illegal” is a destructive
characterization that results in people being “seen as” a status they
acquired at one moment in time.173 In Plyler v. Doe174 and a
companion case, In re Alien Children Education Litigation,175 the
U.S. Supreme Court for the first time explicitly ruled that
unauthorized immigrants were entitled to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment.176 In both cases, the plaintiffs
challenged a Texas statute that allowed the state to withhold its
funds for the education of children who were unauthorized
immigrants. The Texas Legislature had enacted Section 21.031 of
its Education Code in 1975, allowing the state to withhold any
state funds for the education of children who were not “legally
admitted” into the United States and authorizing local school
districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not
“legally admitted” into the country.177
When the cases were decided in the Supreme Court, a 5-4
majority found that undocumented immigrants and their children
were “persons within the jurisdiction of the state” and thus entitled
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 31, 31–62 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2005).
173
See Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and
the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 169–70 (2012)
(noting that government programs and policies continue to make illegality “the
dominant characteristic that defines millions of undocumented immigrants”).
This single “snapshot in time” event becomes a permanent image that overrides
the many other characteristics of the humans included within the group. Id.
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569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff’d 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
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In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex.
1980). The second case was summarily affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
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Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (“[T]he protection of the Fourteenth Amendment
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perimeter.”). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 2037 (2008) (examining the significance of the meaning of
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to equal protection through the Fourteenth Amendment.178 Further,
the Court held that Texas could not “deny to undocumented
school-age children the free public education that it provides to
children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens.”179
In its briefs, Texas argued that the only justification the state
needed for the statute was the characterization that the plaintiff
children were themselves “illegal.”180 According to the Texas
briefs, all children of school age must fall into one of only two
categories, legal or illegal, and the State had a responsibility to
conserve its resources for the education of “legal” children.181
After arguing that the equal protection clause did not apply to
“illegal” immigrants at all, Texas went on to try to justify the
statute on the basis of two rationales: the need to preserve scarce
resources for the education of legal children and the need to
discourage illegal immigration.182 The dissenting opinion in the
Supreme Court agreed with Texas that the distinction between
“illegal” and “legal” children was dispositive: it was a legitimate
ground in itself for determining whose education was funded and
whose was not.183
For the majority, the critical point was the factual finding that
many of the affected children would become permanent residents
of the United States.184 As the trial court put it, “the illegal alien of
178
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Id. at 207 (relying on the finding of the District Court that the impact of
the statute would fall primarily on a very small subclass, “entire families who
have migrated illegally and—for all practical purposes—permanently to the
United States.”). The District Court in the Alien Children Education case found
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today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow.”185 Without an
education, the affected children “[a]lready disadvantaged as a
result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable
racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked into the
lowest socio-economic class.”186 For the majority, the problem
with the statute was captured in this conclusion: allowing the
statute to be enforced would lead to a “permanent caste of
undocumented resident aliens.”187 The Court’s solution
incorporated a novel characterization—that the plaintiff children,
despite their lack of documents, are permanent residents—and
triggered a master story—that education allows all Americans to
pursue equality and avoid a caste system.
Before establishing the novel characterization, the majority
criticized government policies and programs that had resulted in
the “creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal
migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.”188 But
the problem with the Texas statute was not that so many lived in
the shadows; instead, it was that the few immigrants affected by
this statute—families with children—were likely to remain
permanently within the United States. If they did remain
permanently, and if they also remained uneducated, the Texas
policy would “raise[] the specter of a permanent caste of
undocumented resident aliens,” with the plaintiff children being
especially innocent members of this underclass.189
This characterization of immigrant children as permanent
residents—no matter what their citizenship status—served as a
prime or stimulus for another schema, one that amounted to a
master story: the story of Brown v. Board of Education.190 The
decision in Brown, said the majority opinion, symbolized the core
purpose of the equal protection clause: to abolish “governmental

an order of deportation,” id. at 583 n.103.
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barriers . . . to advancement on the basis of individual merit.”191
Moreover, Brown underscored that education is critical to
becoming American (“required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities [and] the very foundation of good
citizenship”) and to having an equal chance of success as an
American.192 Justice Brennan relied as well on the Brown Court’s
conclusion that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”193 Because many of the children “disabled” by being
labeled illegal will remain in the United States, and “some will
become lawful residents or citizens,” Justice Brennan wrote for the
majority that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the State
hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the
problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”194
If the characterization of the children as permanent residents
works in the same way as a novel metaphor, it may be able to shift
the audience’s perspective from the conventional categorization
that Texas advanced: that immigrants must be either legal or
illegal. The permanent resident characterization provides an
alternative and possibly relevant analog or schema to be accessed
from memory. If the reader can identify matches between the
characteristics and relationships of the source, permanent resident,
and those of the target, immigrant children, she may be able to
align the target with the source. Then, inferences derived from the
source may be transferred to the target, creating new information
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that helps fill in the blanks or connect the dots.195
The briefs and opinions illustrated that immigrant children
might be “seen as” illegal or they might be “seen as” permanent
residents. By encouraging the reader to view the children through
the schema for permanent residents, Justice Brennan was able to
cast the children as characters in the story of how equal access to
education will transform America into a land of equal opportunity.
In contrast to this use of a novel characterization, the interplay
of larger perspectives with conventional metaphorical categories
may be seen in another immigration decision196 30 years later. In
that decision, the Supreme Court upheld federal power to regulate
immigration and struck down major portions of an Arizona statute
that had been called the nation’s toughest law on immigration
when it was enacted in 2010.197 In his opinion for the majority,
Justice Anthony Kennedy described the United States as a nation
of immigrants and characterized the power of the “Government of
the United States” with regard to immigration as “broad [and]
undoubted,” resting not only on the Constitution but also on the
inherent power of a national sovereign to conduct relations with
foreign nations.198 He depicted a national government that
exercises its significant power with restraint and discretion. This
characterization of the national government, its power to conduct
relations with foreign nations, and its restraint is the lens through
which Arizona’s law may be seen as undermining federal law.
From a larger perspective, Justice Kennedy viewed the United
States as a member of the international community of nations.199
Considering these characterizations and this perspective, an
audience might re-align its patterns of thought even if Justice
Kennedy did not explicitly state the proposition that only the
national sovereign should control and conduct relations with
foreign nations.
In contrast, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
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part, Justice Antonin Scalia proposed the conventional metaphor
that “[t]he United States is an indivisible ‘Union of sovereign
States.’”200 And he wrote that the majority opinion deprived the
states “of what most would consider the defining characteristic of
sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory
people who have no right to be there.”201 These conventional
metaphors and characterizations accord prominence and centrality
to the sovereign character of the states, and they make the central
feature of sovereignty the power “to forbid the entrance of
foreigners . . . .”202 If Justice Scalia’s characterizations and
metaphors work in the way that the research suggests for
processing of conventional metaphors, the reader will
automatically categorize Arizona’s legislation as warranted.
To sum up, these immigration examples illustrate how novel
characterizations and conventional metaphors may be used to
achieve different goals in legal persuasion. The novel
characterization (immigrant children as permanent residents)
allowed the author to construct a bridge to a persuasive master
story (equal access to education is necessary for equal opportunity
to succeed) while the conventional metaphor (immigrant children
as illegal) provided a category for automatic disposition without
further reflection. Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s international
community perspective may prompt the reader to more deliberately
consider the categorical understanding of sovereignty as the power
to exclude.
CONCLUSION
Better understanding of the thinking and decision-making
processes of judges and juries should help lawyers make more
informed and deliberate choices about persuasion.203 Recent
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research may help lawyers take advantage of the insight that the
same schematic cognition process that leads us to assign negative
characteristics to stereotypes may also allow us to see a violent
criminal as a protective father or an illegal immigrant as a
permanent resident.204
This Article suggests that lawyers should turn to novel
characterizations and metaphors to address one of the persuasion
problems created by the confluence of System 1 and System 2
thinking. Many cognitive scientists agree that our perception and
interpretation follow the process described as schematic cognition:
in other words, we analogize new information we encounter to
schemas and knowledge structures embedded in memory. The
decision-making research also is in agreement about some things:
in System 1 decision making, only the most accessible knowledge
structures are active, and the answer to how to think about and
what to do with the new information is automatic and intuitive.
Adding current analogy research to the mix suggests that novel
metaphors and characterizations may be used to prompt a decision
maker’s intuition to activate various schemas or knowledge
structures beyond those that are immediately accessible.205 The
resulting online processing of the novel metaphor or
characterization resembles the more reflective decision making of
System 2. In situations where the immediately accessible schema
yields an unfavorable answer, prompting the decision maker to
take the more reflective route opens the way to a potentially
persuasive result.
Recommending novel metaphors and characterizations is not
the same thing as recommending that more information be
provided to counter negative stereotypes and expand conventional
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING (2012) (suggesting ways that
psychological findings apply across a spectrum of lawyering roles and tasks);
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006
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categories: the shift being sought through a novel metaphor or
characterization is not a change in what the audience perceives but
in how the audience sees and interprets it. After their review of
schema theory, authors Chen and Hanson concluded that three
conditions must coincide to nudge an audience away from its
tendency to automatically and unconsciously adopt the most
available or active schema or category: “Only when the evidence
available to us is (1) relevant and (2) inconsistent with our schema,
and only when (3) we are otherwise not too cognitively busy, is
there any potential that our schemas and their biasing effects will
be challenged.”206
Yet these authors find room for persuasion within the social
cognition research. In many circumstances, they say, audience
members show some flexibility in choosing among schemas, a
flexibility that can be affected “by factors such as language,
primacy, salience, and priming.”207 The use of analogies and
metaphors may help an audience activate and analyze some
categories and schemas rather than others.208 The use of novel
characterizations and metaphors may be an effective way to
suggest to decision makers that individuals and circumstances
often fit into more than one framework and that they should more
fully consider a more complicated reality.
As language theorists have written, there may be more
effective “ways of changing someone’s mind than changing his or
her beliefs.”209 When we are engaged in legal persuasion, what we
are after is not so much different beliefs, but “changes in the
associations and comparisons one makes, differences in the vivid
or ‘felt’ appreciation of something already known, or changes in
one’s habits of attention and sense of the important and the
trifling.”210 Such changes and differences may fall within the
power of novel metaphors and characterizations.211
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